Enforcing 42 CFR Part 2 segmentation when agents query SUD records through a Postgres MCP server
Treat segmentation as two layers. Use Postgres schemas, roles, row-level security and views to hold the line at the data. Then enforce policy in the MCP tool-call path, where agent identity, declared purpose, consent state, query shape and result content are visible. Each call ends in a decision to allow, redact, block or escalate for human approval, and each decision is recorded as evidence.
Decide the outcome for each call
- 1
Allow
The query touches only untagged data, or consent and validated purpose cover the Part 2 data requested. Pass it through unchanged.
- 2
Redact
Consent covers some of what was asked. Remove tagged columns, rows or free-text spans from the result so only necessary information is returned.
- 3
Block
No consent basis exists, the purpose fails validation, or the statement is a shape you do not permit, such as unscoped joins against Part 2 tables.
- 4
Escalate for human approval
Consent state is ambiguous, scope is unclear, or the request is unusually broad. Hold the call until a named approver decides.
Evidence to retain for every decision
- Identity: the agent, the user it acted for, and the service connection used
- Purpose: the declared purpose and how it was validated
- Consent basis: the consent record or authority relied on, as read at call time
- Policy applied: the rule and its version
- Action taken: allow, redact, block or escalate, plus the approver for escalations
- Data categories returned: which tagged categories, if any, left the boundary
What the rule asks of an automated reader
Under 42 CFR 2.13(a), Part 2 patient records may be used or disclosed only as the regulations permit, and any permitted use or disclosure is limited to the information necessary to carry out its purpose. Under 2.13(b), those limits hold even if the requester is believed to have the information already or offers some other unpermitted justification. For an agent, that second point matters: a stated reason for a query does not make the access permitted.
The restrictions reach records that identify a patient as having or having had a substance use disorder (SUD), directly, by reference to publicly available information, or through verification by another person. They cover records from a federally assisted SUD program (a Part 2 program) kept for treatment, diagnosis for that treatment, or referral. HHS states that patients can give a single consent for future uses and disclosures for treatment, payment and health care operations. The 2024 final rule took effect April 16, 2024, and compliance was required by February 16, 2026, so as of November 2026 it applies in full. Noncompliance is enforced through the HIPAA enforcement provisions in 45 CFR part 160, subparts C, D and E.
Which obligations fall on you depends on your role: Part 2 program, recipient, qualified service organization, covered entity or business associate. Whether agent access counts as a use or disclosure needing consent is a determination for counsel. The design below assumes that determination has been made and focuses on enforcing it.
Where segmentation breaks in an agent-to-Postgres path
The most common failure is identity collapse. An MCP server typically connects to Postgres with one service credential, so the database sees a single role regardless of which agent, user or purpose triggered the call. Row-level security keyed to the session role cannot distinguish them.
The second failure is missing context. A Postgres policy can evaluate data in the database, but a stated purpose, the agent's identity, and the current consent decision may not be there. If consent lives in another system, or changes after the connection is opened, a connection-time check is stale by the next call.
The third is query shape. An agent can issue free-form SQL, so a query that never selects a SUD column can still reveal one. A count of patients in a clinic program, an existence check, or a join to an encounter table can identify someone as having a SUD. Free-text note columns in non-SUD tables can carry the same information.
The fourth is result handling. Whatever the query returns goes into the agent's context and may be passed to other tools or users. A control that only inspects the request cannot see that.
Build the database foundation first
Start by inventorying which tables and columns hold records that originate from a Part 2 program, and tag them. Earlier rulemaking text described segmentation as tagging and consent management working together, and said a separate server is not required to hold such records. Logical separation in Postgres is therefore a reasonable starting point.
- Schema separation: Place Part 2 tables in their own schema. Grant usage only to roles that need it, so a missed grant fails closed.
- Dedicated agent roles: Give the MCP server roles that are narrower than any human role. Avoid one broad role shared by every tool.
- Views as the access surface: Expose security-barrier views that omit SUD columns and rows by default. Do not grant agents direct table access.
- Row-level security: Restrict rows by a patient or record tag, and set session variables per request where your connection handling allows it.
- Column minimization: Return only the columns a purpose needs, which supports the necessary-information limit in 2.13(a).
Add enforcement in the tool-call path
A tool call to a Postgres MCP server carries a tool name and arguments, and for a SQL tool the argument is usually the SQL text. Agent identity and declared purpose are not part of that SQL. The deployment has to attach them to the call, and the policy layer has to treat the purpose as a claim to validate against consent or authority, not as a fact.
A policy engine in this path can evaluate, per call: the agent and the user it acts for, the tool, the parsed statement and the tables it touches, the declared purpose, the patient's consent state, and the result set before it goes back to the agent. Consent therefore needs to be queryable data, including whether a single treatment, payment and operations consent exists. The consent scope fields are your own design and need privacy review.
Trussed enforces policy in the execution path across agents, tools and MCP servers, at the level of individual interactions and tool calls. It works alongside the database controls above and does not replace them. It can be self-managed in the customer cloud, so call content and evidence stay within your boundary.
Tradeoffs and first steps
Runtime enforcement adds latency and a dependency on consent data being current. Redaction needs reliable tagging, and free-text fields will be the hardest to tag. Aggregate and existence queries may need to be blocked or escalated more often than raw column access, and that costs some agent usefulness. These are reasonable prices for keeping the necessary-information limit enforceable.
A practical order of work: settle your role under Part 2, tag Part 2 data, move agent access to views under narrow roles, make consent queryable, then define the four outcomes and the evidence record before agents reach production. Test with adversarial query shapes, such as counts, joins and note searches, not just direct column reads.
Two layers of Part 2 segmentation
Database layer
Separate schemas, narrow roles, row-level security and views around Part 2 data.
Tool-call layer
Policy evaluated on each call using identity, purpose, consent state, SQL shape and results.
Decision
Allow, redact, block or escalate for human approval.
Evidence
A record of who asked, on what basis, what policy applied and what was returned.
See policy enforced on a Postgres MCP tool call
Review how enforcement in the execution path produces allow, redact and block decisions with audit-ready evidence for your regulated enterprise.
See How Evidence Is ProducedHow does your AI governance program compare?
See where your program has gaps in less than 2 minutes.