Why AI security engineering requires a different interview bar
A traditional security engineer interview loop typically covers web application security, network defense, and identity and access management. Those competencies remain necessary, but they do not cover the attack surfaces introduced by production AI systems. OWASP's Top 10 for LLM Applications identifies prompt injection, insecure output handling, excessive agency, and sensitive information disclosure as leading risk categories specific to LLM-integrated systems. MITRE ATLAS catalogs adversary techniques such as model evasion, training data poisoning, and ML supply-chain compromise, structured similarly to MITRE ATT&CK. An interview process built only around generic security questions will not surface whether a candidate understands these risks or how to design controls against them. Structuring the loop around discrete, job-relevant competency domains produces a more consistent hiring bar and reduces the chance of mis-hires who are strong in traditional security but unfamiliar with model and agent-specific risk.
Model and data security questions
This domain tests whether a candidate understands attack surfaces unique to models and their training and inference pipelines, not just the applications wrapped around them. Useful prompts include asking a candidate to walk through how they would detect and respond to a data poisoning attempt against a training pipeline, referencing MITRE ATLAS technique categories where relevant. Another line of questioning probes familiarity with NIST's Generative AI Profile (NIST AI 600-1), which extends the AI RMF with generative-specific risks such as confabulation and data privacy leakage, and asks candidates to explain how these risks change monitoring or output-handling requirements compared to a traditional application. Strong candidates distinguish between securing the model itself, securing the data pipeline feeding it, and securing the application layer that consumes its output, rather than treating these as a single undifferentiated concern.
AI agent runtime security questions
Agent runtime risk differs from static application security because permissions must constrain a model's dynamic action selection rather than a fixed set of user roles. A representative scenario question describes an agent with access to a customer database read tool and a refund-processing tool, and asks the candidate to reason through how they would scope permissions so the agent cannot chain those tools into an unauthorized action. This tests direct familiarity with OWASP's Excessive Agency risk category, which describes systems granted more functionality, permissions, or autonomy than required for their intended operation. Follow-up questions should probe how the candidate would detect permission escalation attempts at runtime and how they would apply zero-trust principles, consistent with the joint NSA/CISA guidance on securely deploying AI systems, to agent-initiated actions rather than only to human-initiated ones.
Scenario prompts work better than abstract risk questions. Describe a concrete agent workflow with named tools, then ask the candidate to scope permissions, detect misuse, and contain a failure.
MCP, tool-call governance, and agent identity
The Model Context Protocol, published by Anthropic in November 2024, defines a standardized way for AI applications to connect to external tools and data sources through primitives such as tool registries and resource scoping. Because this is a newer architectural surface, legacy API security or IAM interview questions will not reveal whether a candidate can reason about it correctly. Effective questions ask candidates to critique a sample tool configuration for overly broad scopes, explain how they would design audit logging for agent tool calls given the non-deterministic nature of model outputs, or describe how identity and permission models must change when an autonomous agent, rather than a human, initiates a request. Since MCP security practices are still evolving, interviewers should focus less on protocol trivia and more on whether the candidate demonstrates sound first-principles reasoning about least privilege and traceability in an agentic context.