Why Context Windows Need Attestation
Every turn of an AI agent's operation assembles a context window from several sources at once: the system prompt, prior conversation turns, retrieved documents, and the output of any tools the agent has called. The model treats everything placed into that window as trustworthy input, regardless of where it originated. If any of those sources can be altered, substituted, or injected with unauthorized instructions before the model reasons over them, the agent's output can be manipulated without touching the model itself. Attestation exists to close that gap by checking what is going into the context, not just what came out of it.
Definition and Scope
Context window attestation is a runtime security control that verifies the provenance and integrity of content as it is assembled into an LLM's active context, before the model reasons over it. Its scope depends on which context sources a given implementation actually covers: tool outputs, retrieved documents, prior conversation turns, and system prompts can each be included or excluded. A narrow implementation that only attests to one of these sources provides materially weaker guarantees than one that covers all of them, which is why scope should be confirmed explicitly rather than assumed from a vendor's general description.
Context Window Attestation vs. Adjacent Practices
Attestation is often confused with logging and input validation because all three appear in discussions of AI security posture. They operate at different points in the request lifecycle and answer different questions.
| Practice | When it operates | What it does not confirm |
|---|---|---|
| Prompt or request logging | After the request has completed | Whether context was tampered with before the model used it |
| Input validation / sanitization | At ingress, on a single input | Provenance and integrity of content added later from tools or retrieval |
| Context window attestation | At context assembly, before inference | Not applicable: this is the point of verification itself |
Role in Prompt Injection and Tool-Call Manipulation
Prompt injection and tool-call manipulation typically work by smuggling instructions into content the model will trust, such as a retrieved document, a web page, or the return value of a tool call. Because this content enters the context window alongside legitimate instructions, the model has no inherent way to tell the two apart. Attestation addresses this by checking whether context was modified without authorization during assembly, rather than simply recording what was assembled after the fact. That distinction matters: a mechanism that only logs the final context can confirm what happened, but it cannot prevent or flag unauthorized modification at the moment it occurs.
Where This Fits in Runtime Governance
Context integrity is one layer within a broader runtime security posture for AI agents, alongside agent identity, tool approval, and audit logging. Attestation does not replace these controls; it addresses a specific gap that sits before the model reasons over its context, where injected or tampered content would otherwise go unnoticed until after an action has already been taken.