Why This Comparison Matters Now
Enterprises deploying autonomous AI agents face a category problem: agents are neither human users nor traditional static service accounts. They call tools, invoke APIs, and take multi-step actions that change context mid-task. Existing identity platforms were architected for authentication and access provisioning, not for evaluating what a non-deterministic agent does in the moment.
Over the past year, Microsoft and Okta have both extended their platforms to address AI agents as a distinct identity class. Microsoft introduced Entra Agent ID, and Okta has expanded its Identity Governance and Workforce Identity capabilities to discover and govern non-human identities, including agents. Both moves matter, but they address a specific part of the problem: identity issuance and lifecycle governance. Neither vendor's public documentation describes enforcing policy on individual tool calls or actions at runtime. That gap is where a dedicated runtime governance layer becomes relevant.
What Microsoft Entra Agent ID Covers
Entra Agent ID assigns a unique identity object to AI agents built in Microsoft Copilot Studio and Azure AI Foundry, representing them in Entra ID similarly to service principals. This allows agents to authenticate, appear in directory views, and be subject to existing lifecycle management and access review processes. Microsoft has stated plans to extend support to agents built outside its own platforms, though current documentation centers on the Microsoft ecosystem.
Critically, Microsoft's own materials distinguish between an agent's registered identity, used for authentication, and the permissions granted to that identity, which are configured statically through RBAC and conditional access policies. Those permissions are set before the agent runs. They do not adapt based on what the agent is attempting to do during a specific task.
What Okta's Non-Human Identity Governance Covers
Okta's agent-related capabilities sit within its Identity Governance and Identity Security Posture Management product lines. The emphasis is on discovering non-human identity sprawl, including agent and service accounts, and applying existing governance workflows such as access certification and deprovisioning to this new identity class.
This is valuable for visibility and compliance hygiene: knowing which agents exist, what they were provisioned to access, and whether that access is still appropriate on a periodic review cycle. It is not designed as a real-time execution-monitoring system. Access certifications and reviews in IGA tooling operate on a schedule, not at the speed of an agent completing a multi-step task in seconds.
Identity Issuance vs Runtime Governance
The Architectural Gap Between Issuance and Enforcement
Issuing a credential to an agent answers the question of who the agent is and what it was granted access to at provisioning time. It does not answer whether a specific action the agent takes five steps into a task, using context that did not exist when the credential was issued, should be permitted. Static RBAC and conditional access policies are evaluated at authentication or session boundaries, not at the granularity of individual function calls or tool invocations.
This matters operationally because AI agents are frequently designed to call external tools, chain multiple actions, and make decisions that were not fully specified in advance. A provisioning-time policy cannot anticipate every downstream action an agent might attempt. Standards guidance from NIST and CISA on non-human identity reinforces this pattern: both focus on credential lifecycle, authentication, and inventory as baseline practices, without prescribing runtime behavioral enforcement for autonomous software agents. This is a genuine gap in current standards and platform coverage, not a marketing framing.
The core distinction
Identity issuance answers "who is this agent and what was it granted." Runtime governance answers "should this specific action be allowed, right now, given the current context."
Where Runtime Governance Fits
Runtime governance operates at a different point in the stack than identity issuance. Rather than determining what an agent is allowed to have, it evaluates what an agent is attempting to do, at the moment it attempts it, against defined policy. This includes approving or blocking specific tool calls, enforcing least-privilege constraints dynamically rather than statically, and producing audit logs that capture the actual actions and decisions an agent made, not just the fact that it authenticated successfully.
Trussed AI is built for this layer. It does not issue directory identities or replace IAM/CIAM platforms. It works alongside them, applying runtime policy enforcement, tool approval workflows, and audit logging to agent actions as they occur, including in agent-to-agent and MCP-based interactions where a single provisioned identity may be used across many distinct, context-dependent actions.