Compliance Guide

    SR 26-2 for Large Banks: Model Risk Management, Runtime Enforcement and Audit-Ready Evidence for AI

    SR 26-2, issued by the Federal Reserve on April 17, 2026 in coordination with the OCC and FDIC, is expected to be most relevant to Fed-regulated banking organizations with over $30 billion in total assets. It asks for model risk management tailored to size, complexity and model risk profile, with governance, controls, monitoring and documentation. Applying it to AI in production is interpretation, not stated requirement. Under that reading, a large bank should be able to show what its AI systems were permitted to do and what they did, and enforcement in the execution path can produce that evidence at the point of action.

    What an audit-ready evidence record for AI could contain

    1. 1

      Policy version applied

      The identifier of the policy in force at the moment of the decision, so changes can be tied to outcomes.

    2. 2

      Decision taken

      Allow, redact, block or escalate, recorded at the point of enforcement.

    3. 3

      Requester identity and context

      The user, service or agent making the request and the use case it belongs to.

    4. 4

      Target of the action

      The model call or tool call involved, with enough detail to place it in a use case and exposure tier.

    5. 5

      Timestamp

      A reliable time for each decision, so records can be retrieved for any review period.

    6. 6

      Approver and outcome for escalations

      Who approved or rejected an escalated action, and when.

    Assess whether your controls would withstand examiner scrutiny

    • Confirm your primary regulator and total assets against the stated applicability, and document how your supervisor applies the guidance.
    • Agree one reading across model risk, compliance and technology of what counts as a model or AI-enabled tool in scope, and record the institution's own basis.
    • Compare each written AI policy statement with a control that is actually enforced in production, and list the gaps that rest on review alone.
    • Define evidence per AI interaction and tool call, then test whether records can be retrieved for a chosen period without manual reconstruction.
    • Check that monitoring and issue-response procedures cover AI systems both before and after approval for use, and that exceptions and responses are retained.

    What SR 26-2 says about the asset threshold

    The Federal Reserve's SR 26-2 letter, dated April 17, 2026, attaches revised Supervisory Guidance on Model Risk Management. The OCC announced updated guidance for the institutions it supervises the same day, and the FDIC published a release, all described as coordinated across the three agencies. As of November 2026, the sources reviewed give no separate effective or compliance date beyond issuance.

    The letter states that it is expected to be most relevant to banking organizations regulated by the Federal Reserve with over $30 billion in total assets. That wording is about expected relevance. It is not a hard coverage rule, and a bank near the line should not treat it as a bright-line exemption or a bright-line trigger. Institutions supervised by the OCC or FDIC should confirm with their own supervisor how the guidance applies to them.

    The agencies also say model risk management should be tailored commensurately to the size, complexity and model risk profile of the organization, and that practices appropriately vary with risk profiles and model usage. For a large bank, tailoring does not mean less. It means the institution needs a documented rationale for why the depth of its controls matches the exposure of each model and use. Model exposure, in the guidance, is the significance of model output to business decisions, and it tends to be greater for models affecting larger portfolios or having larger business impact.

    Which expectations bear on AI in production

    The reading in this section is interpretation. The guidance addresses models generally, and the agencies have said they plan to issue a request for information on model risk management that would consider banks' use of AI, including generative AI, agentic AI and AI-based models. Until that work lands, risk leaders have to map existing expectations to AI uses themselves.

    Four parts of the guidance map most directly. Governance: the guidance states that all components of the model lifecycle benefit from governance supported by clear policies and effective controls, and that effective policies define expectations and a framework for assessing the magnitude of model risk. Monitoring: an effective ongoing monitoring plan may include regularly assessing model limitations at development and over time, with procedures for responding to issues before and after a model is approved for use. Documentation: adequate documentation supports continuity of operations, tracking of recommendations, responses and exceptions, and management of remediation. Internal audit: its role is generally to evaluate whether model risk management practices are rigorous and effective and whether related policies are implemented accordingly.

    For AI, exposure suggests scoping controls by use case and business impact, not with one institution-wide setting. An internal drafting assistant and an AI agent that can call tools touching customer data carry different exposure, and the controls and evidence should differ accordingly. Effective challenge, described as critical analysis by objective experts who evaluate model risk and effect appropriate changes, still applies. It is a separate activity from any runtime control.

    Where documented policy and enforced behavior diverge

    The phrase in the guidance about policies being implemented accordingly is where many programs are weakest. A model risk policy may state what AI systems may do, which data they may touch and when a human must approve an action. In production, that policy is often enforced by review: sampled transcripts, periodic access reviews, or investigation after an incident. Those are legitimate detective controls, but they show what a team found, not what the system was permitted to do at the time of each action.

    Runtime policy enforcement changes the timing. A control point in the execution path, covering model calls and tool calls, applies policy before the action completes. The actions are the same four most programs already discuss: allow the interaction, redact sensitive content, block it, or escalate it for human approval. These terms are a design framework used on this page. They are not language from SR 26-2.

    The evidence consequence matters as much as the control. If the enforcement point records its own decision, the bank holds a contemporaneous record of what was permitted and what occurred. Records reconstructed later from application logs depend on assumptions about which policy was active and why a call was handled as it was. The guidance does not specify evidence artifacts or examiner procedures, and the principle of generating evidence at the point of enforcement is a design position, not a stated examiner requirement. It is, however, a direct way to support the guidance's expectations on documentation of exceptions and responses.

    Evaluating runtime enforcement, and where Trussed fits

    When evaluating any runtime control and evidence layer, ask whether it enforces policy in the execution path or only reports afterward. Ask what record it produces for each interaction and tool call, whether that record can be exported for examiner or internal audit review, how policy versions are tied to recorded decisions, and whether human-approval escalations capture the approver and the outcome. Ask equally what it does not cover. No runtime layer should be presented as model validation, effective challenge or a substitute for governance process.

    Trussed is a runtime control and evidence layer for regulated enterprises. It enforces policy in the execution path across models, agents, tools and MCP servers, with allow, redact, block, rate limit and escalate-for-human-approval actions applied to individual interactions and tool calls. It generates continuous audit-ready evidence from that enforcement and can be self-managed in the customer's cloud, with configurable retention and data residency. It is not a validation, pre-deployment testing or GRC product.

    Trussed is deepest in insurance, another regulated financial sector, and also serves healthcare, pharma and education. Its approved production proof points are 18+ months of continuous production in a regulated enterprise, 99.95% uptime on live production traffic, 100+ models under one policy plane, and 30+ GB of audit evidence generated per day. These describe operating experience under regulatory scrutiny in other sectors, and the evaluation questions above are the right test for any bank's fit.

    From written policy to examinable behavior

    Threshold

    Expected to be most relevant above $30 billion in total assets for Fed-regulated organizations.

    Expectation

    Governance, controls, monitoring and documentation tailored to model risk profile.

    Runtime enforcement

    Allow, redact, block or escalate for human approval before an action completes.

    Evidence

    Records generated at the point of enforcement, not reconstructed later.

    Test your AI controls against the evidence an examiner would ask for

    Walk through your AI uses, the policies that govern them and the records you could produce today, and identify where enforcement at runtime would close the gap.

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