What the Model Context Protocol Is
The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an open protocol that Anthropic introduced in November 2024 to standardize how AI applications connect to external data sources and tools. Before MCP, connecting an AI agent to a database, file system, or internal API typically required a custom integration built specifically for that combination of model and system. MCP was designed to replace this fragmented approach with a single standardized way for AI applications to discover and use external capabilities, regardless of which system provides them or which AI model is making the request.
What an MCP Server Actually Exposes
MCP servers expose their capabilities through three defined primitives: tools, which represent actions the agent can invoke; resources, which represent data the agent can read; and prompts, which are reusable interaction templates. This separation gives AI applications a consistent way to understand what a given server allows an agent to do versus what it allows the agent to see.
Communication between clients and servers is based on JSON-RPC 2.0 messages, transmitted over one of several defined transport mechanisms. Local MCP servers commonly run on the same machine as the host application using a standard input/output transport, while remote servers use HTTP-based transports over a network. Because the protocol is transport- and vendor-agnostic, a single MCP server can, in principle, be reused across multiple AI applications that implement an MCP client, rather than being built for one product alone.
Why This Term Is Showing Up in Enterprise Conversations Now
MCP moved from a single-vendor proposal to a broadly adopted pattern within roughly a year of its introduction. OpenAI and Google DeepMind both announced support for MCP in their own agent frameworks during 2025, and Microsoft has integrated MCP support into development tools including Copilot Studio and Windows AI Foundry. This cross-vendor adoption is why enterprise leaders and non-technical stakeholders are increasingly encountering the term: as organizations connect AI agents to internal systems, MCP servers are becoming a common piece of the resulting technical stack, regardless of which underlying AI model or platform is used.
Security and Governance Considerations
Adopting MCP shifts part of an organization's AI risk surface away from the model itself and onto the external servers and tools an agent can reach. Because an MCP server can be published by any third party, enterprises that install unverified or unvetted servers take on a form of software supply-chain risk, similar to installing an unreviewed dependency or browser extension.
Independent security researchers have identified a specific risk known as tool poisoning, in which malicious instructions are embedded directly in a tool's description text. Because the AI model treats these descriptions as instructions, a compromised or malicious server can manipulate agent behavior without the user necessarily seeing any indication that something is wrong. The MCP specification itself does not mandate server authentication, so trust in a given server is implicit unless the implementing organization adds explicit verification.
Official MCP documentation does address some of these concerns directly, including guidance on trust boundaries, user consent before tool execution, and data access controls. However, no government agency or formal standards body has yet issued MCP-specific regulatory guidance, and general AI governance frameworks do not yet contain provisions written specifically for this protocol. This leaves enterprises to apply existing principles, such as least privilege, auditability, and vendor risk management, to a component that most governance programs were not originally designed to account for.
Runtime governance and security platforms, including Trussed AI, are built to apply controls at this layer, such as enforcing least-privilege access per MCP server connection, requiring approval workflows before new tools are used, and logging tool and resource